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I. Introduction	
 
Convenience is important to everyone. In our fast-paced society, people are willing to 
pay for devices that can save them time, even if it is just a few minutes. Over the past few years, 
the Internet of Things (IoT), or smart devices, have become a popular way for people to leverage 
technology in order to save them time. These devices can be used in every area of a home, 
including the entryways, the kitchen, and the living room. 
 While all of these devices make daily life more convenient, their lack of security makes 
hacker’s lives more convenient, too.  The majority of IoT devices lack basic security features and 
most consumers install the devices in their homes with the default settings. This provides cyber 
criminals with the means to hack into a system with minimal time and effort.  
This paper will focus on the security of a popular smart device, the smart light bulb. I will 
compare the security features of two different smart light bulbs by running a series of tests 
against them. The main aspects of the light bulbs that will be tested include the phone application 
that controls the light bulb and the protocols that the phone application uses to communicate with 
the light bulb.  
II. Internet	of	Things	(IoT)	Devices	Defined	
 
According to Webopedia, the Internet of Things (IoT) is defined as the “ever-growing 
network of physical objects that feature an IP address for internet connectivity, and the 
communication that occurs between these objects and other internet-enabled devices and 
systems” (Stroud, 2018). Many common, household items are now enabled to connect to the 
internet, such as coffee makers, refrigerators, televisions, outlets, garage doors, door locks, and 
light bulbs. The convenience of controlling these household items from phone applications has 
greatly increased the popularity of these devices. Gartner predicts that the number of devices that 
are connected to the internet will double by 2020, bringing the total number of smart devices 
close to 26 billion (Chi, 2018).   
IoT devices are generally made up of four components. These components include the 
sensors or devices, connectivity, data processing, and a user interface (McClelland, 2017). An 
IoT device can be just a sensor, or it can be multiple sensors that make up a more complex 
device, such as a phone or kitchen appliance. These sensors are used to collect the necessary data 
for the device to function.  
The collected data is then sent to either a cloud application or another IoT device for 
processing (McClelland, 2017). These devices communicate by sending signals through 
Bluetooth, WiFi, variations of low-power, wide area networks, or cellular connection (Puri, 
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2017). The method of communication is determined by the amount of data that needs to be 
transferred, the distance it needs to travel, and the amount of power that is available on the 
transmitting device (Puri, 2017).   
Once the data has successfully reached its destination, it is processed and provided to the user 
through an interface, such as a phone application. The user can then analyze the data and use it to 
make decisions. The user can also use the interface to communicate back to the device 
(McClelland, 2017).  
III. Background	on	IoT	Security	
 
 The security of IoT devices has been an issue since they first became popular. According 
to a study done by Symantec, criminal attacks on IoT devices have grown by 600% in the last 
year (Internet Security Threat Report, 2018). As the number of connected devices continues to 
grow, so will the attack surface cyber criminals can use to obtain sensitive personal information, 
gain physical access to a home, or use device resources for crypto mining purposes.   
 There are many factors that play into the lack of security in IoT devices. One factor is 
that manufacturers want to create an appealing, affordable product that people will purchase. The 
majority of purchase decisions are made based on the features the product has to offer, the price 
of the product, and what the product looks like (Armerding, 2018). The security of the product is 
normally not considered by consumers. This causes manufacturers to spend less time developing 
the security of the product, and more time on the visible features that consumers care about 
(Armerding, 2018).  
Another factor is that many of these devices have software, hardware, and firmware that 
are created by different companies and are then compiled to produce the end product 
(Higginbotham, 2018). This creates more opportunities for oversight on how the hardware, 
software, and firmware components will work together securely. The reliability of each of the 
companies must be taken into consideration, as well. The hardware company may be one of the 
most secure companies in the industry, but if the software installed on their product is not 
supplied with regular patches, the entire product can become vulnerable (Higginbotham, 2018). 
A third factor to consider is that most consumers are not technology experts and do not 
know how to properly secure their IoT devices. They connect the devices to their home networks 
and are satisfied as long as they work as expected.  They may not realize that leaving the default 
password on their device exposes their entire home network to compromise. Many 
manufacturers argue that if they made their devices too secure, normal consumers would not 
know how to use them (Armerding, 2018). Finding the balance between providing consumers 
with a secure, but convenient, device is a challenge the industry is facing (Armerding, 2018).  
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IV. Scope	of	Experiment	and	Expected	Vulnerabilities	
 
 This experiment will focus on two different brands of smart light bulb, the JB Smart Bulb 
and the Hao Deng Smart Bulb. The scope of the experiments will include the Bluetooth traffic 
between the phone application and the light bulb as well as the phone application itself. The 
hardware of the light bulb, the phone’s operating system, and the overall network will be 
considered out of scope. 
 I expect to find several of the most common IoT vulnerabilities in each of the smart 
lightbulbs. These vulnerabilities include: 
• Network traffic transmitted in clear text  
• Default passwords that are available online to login to the devices should they require 
authentication 
• Pairing and controlling the lightbulbs with a device that does not have the appropriate 
phone application installed 
I will conduct the same tests on each light bulb to ensure I obtain comparable results. 
V. Penetration	Test	Scenarios	and	Results	–	JB	Smart	Bulb	
 
I started my testing with the JB Smart Bulb application and light bulb. The application 
was very basic and only had five screens. The Bluetooth screen showed whether or not you were 
connected to the light bulb. The music screen allowed you to upload, play, and pause music 
through the speaker on the light bulb. The main control screen allowed you to change the color 
of the light bulb and set it to change the colors manually or automatically based on the beat of 
the music playing. The application’s power screen allowed you to turn the light bulb on and off. 
The last screen was the settings screen, which provided options to rename the light bulb’s 
Bluetooth connection and to set a timer for the light bulb to turn off or on. 
My first tests focused on the input field in the settings screen that allowed you to rename 
the light bulb’s Bluetooth connection. I attempted to run a SQL injection attack by running the 
following command: 
• ‘ OR 1=1-- 
I wanted to see whether or not there was a SQL database behind the application. It was not 
successful. I then attempted variations of a cross-site scripting attack by inputting the following 
command: 
• <script> alert (123) </script> 
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 This was not successful, either, because it is not a web application. There is an attack that is 
similar to cross-site scripting for phone applications, known as cross-app scripting. This 
vulnerability can be found in the Android browser (Kumar, 2011). Cross-app scripting uses 
vulnerabilities in the calls made from one application to view web pages in other applications 
(Kumar, 2011). Since this application did not interact with the Android browser, I was not able 
to test this scenario.   
My next test was to see whether I could overload the input field with a large number of 
characters. The field was set to have a character limit of 56 characters and prevented my 
overflow attack. I then wanted to test the input sanitation of the application. I added emojis into 
the text field, and was able to save it successfully. This proved that, aside from the character 
limit, there was no input validation on the text field. However, since the field did not appear to 
be connected to any other functionality aside from renaming the Bluetooth connection using a 
string value, I did not see a reason to continue to pursue the tests. 
The next scenario I tried was attempting to pair the light bulb with a different phone that 
did not have the light bulb’s phone application installed. This was done successfully. I was able 
to play music and sound clips through the light bulb’s built-in speaker from the phone, as well. 
This proves that no authentication is required in order to control the light bulb, which would be 
considered a critical vulnerability. 
 Without a form of authentication, anyone that has the JB Smart Bulb application 
installed on their phone could take control of the light bulb without permission from the 
homeowner as long as they were in the range of the Bluetooth connection. They could turn the 
lights in the house on and off, change the colors of the light, rename the Bluetooth connections, 
and play music over the built-in speaker. This could not only create a sense of fear in anyone that 
had these light bulbs installed in their home, but could also increase their electric bills if the 
attacker continuously turned the lights and speakers on without the homeowner’s knowledge.  
This also eliminates the possibility for this light bulb to be used in a public location, such 
as in a business or a school setting. Without needing the application installed on a phone, an 
attacker could take control of the sound that comes out of the light bulbs. This could be easily 
abused by creating a recording that sounded like an important announcement and playing it over 
the speakers. Depending on the announcement that was made, this could cause a large amount of 
panic and could force an unwarranted evacuation of a building. If the attacker did have the 
application installed on their phone, they could use it to turn the lights on and off, which could 
cause disruptions throughout the day.   
The final issue that I found with the JB Smart Bulb was simply a bug within the 
application. If you turned the light bulb off on the power screen, then went to the light bulb color 
screen and selected a color, the light bulb would turn on with the selected color. However, when 
you returned to the power screen in the application, it still showed the light bulb as being turned 
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off. I then had to change the position of the switch in the application to the on position and then 
turn it back to the off position in order to turn the light bulb off, again. While this may not be a 
security vulnerability in itself, it was still an unintended function that suggests that there may be 
other programming bugs in the application that could be used for more serious security 
exploitations.  
VI. Penetration	Test	Scenarios	and	Results	–	HaoDeng	Smart	Bulb	
 
The HaoDeng Smart Bulb application was more sophisticated than the JB Smart Bulb 
application. When the application was first installed on my phone, it prompted me for a login ID 
or to add a new device to a network. Since I did not have a login ID, I selected the option to add 
a new device. It then prompted me to name the network. Since this was an input field, I began to 
run potential input exploits. I attempted a SQL injection exploit by running the following 
command: 
• ‘OR1=1 – 
This was not successful. I also attempted cross-site scripting by running the following command: 
• <script> alert (123) </script> 
Again, this was not successful. I then attempted to overflow the input field with a large amount 
of characters. There was no maximum character limit set on the input field, so I was able to 
overflow the field, which ultimately caused the application to crash.  
Once I restarted the application, I began to look through how it was set up. The application 
allows you to create groups to simplify the control of multiple smart light bulbs in one area at 
once. The application prompted me with an input field when I was creating a group. I attempted 
the character overflow vulnerability, again, and was able to successfully crash the application. 
Once the application was restarted, I created two more groups with emojis and other scripting 
characters. I was able to successfully save both groups. I then realized that the groups began to 
multiply. I started with three groups that I had created, but ended up with over one hundred 
groups. Scrolling down the list of groups caused the application to crash, again.  
I eventually had to completely uninstall and reinstall the application to continue with my 
testing. I would consider this a high vulnerability. One common first step in hacking an 
application is to overflow an input field. If an attacker is able to successfully find an input field 
that does not contain a maximum character limit, they can use that field to run buffer overflow 
attacks with shellcode. This could potentially provide them with access to other areas in the 
phone to run arbitrary code, access sensitive information, or completely stop the phone from 
working.  
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The next scenario I tested was to pair a different phone without the application installed on it 
to the light bulb. This test was not successful. This application does require the user to have the 
application installed. There is also an area in the application for the owner of the light bulb to set 
up others with permissions to control the light bulb. The owner can set up visitors with limited 
access and controls, or administrators, which have full rights to control the light bulb. This 
proves that it is possible to create a workable authentication solution for smart light bulbs that the 
JB Smart Bulb was lacking.  
The other noteworthy feature in this application was the firmware update option. In the main 
menu, there is an option to check for firmware updates for the device. This is makes it easy for 
consumers to ensure their devices are up-to-date with the latest firmware. Since out-of-date 
firmware is one area that cyber criminals look for exploitations, I thought this was a great 
addition to the application and allows non-technical users to keep their devices as current as 
possible.  
VII. Bluetooth	Traffic	Logs	
 
In order to see how secure the traffic between my phone and the light bulbs was, I reviewed 
the Bluetooth capture logs from my phone. I did this by first installing Android developer on my 
laptop so that I could run the Android Debug Bridge (adb) commands. Next, I had to put my 
phone in developer mode and enable the Bluetooth HCI snoop log and the USB debugging 
options. 
Once I had generated Bluetooth traffic between my phone and both of the light bulbs, I 
plugged my phone into my laptop and created a bug report by running the following command:   
• adb bugreport anewbugreportfolder 
 This command created a compressed file that contained the Bluetooth traffic logs. I used 
WireShark to open and inspect the files.  
Both lightbulbs were using the Bluetooth HCI (Host Controller Interface) H4 protocol. This 
means that they were both using Bluetooth Core Specification 2.1 + EDR (Enhanced Data Rate) 
to communicate (Host Controller Interface: Specifications, 2018).  This version of Bluetooth was 
released in 2007 and allows data rates to reach maximum data transfer speeds of 3 Mbps (Blom, 
2018).  
This version of Bluetooth also contains secure simple pairing (SSP) (Blom, 2018). Secure 
simple pairing makes the connection of one Bluetooth device to another Bluetooth device easier 
for end users (Padgette et al., 2017). The SSP process should also make the Bluetooth connection 
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more secure by encrypting the traffic using a Diffie-Hellman key agreement to create a link key 
between the two devices (Barnickel et al., 2012).  
There are four ways in which a Bluetooth device using SSP can validate the key agreement 
with another Bluetooth device including numeric comparison, passkey entry, just works, and out 
of band (Padgette et al., 2017). In order to pair my phone to the light bulb, the “just works” 
association model was used. The process works similarly to the numeric comparison process. In 
the numeric comparison process, a six-digit number is generated on each device (Padgette et al., 
2017). As long as the digits displayed on each device match, the user allows the pairing to 
continue.  
The “just works” model is used when one of the Bluetooth devices does not have a display or 
a keyboard available, preventing the end user to check the six-digit number on the second device 
(Padgette et al., 2017). The end user is prompted to accept the Bluetooth connection without 
verifying that the numeric value that is on each device matches. By default, the six digit value for 
the “just works” model is set to six zeros to ensure the devices both agree on the numeric value 
(Loveless, 2018). 
This method provides no protection against MITM (Man-in-the-Middle) attacks because the 
Diffie-Hellman public key exchange cannot be authenticated (Barnickel et al., 2012). This means 
that anyone who is able to intercept the Bluetooth traffic between the phone and the light bulbs 
could alter that traffic to send different commands. Though I did not have the means to test this 
vulnerability, it appears that both light bulbs would be susceptible to this attack.   
VIII. Testing	Conclusions	
 
Although both lightbulbs and phone applications had their faults, I believe that the 
HaoDeng lightbulb is more secure than the JB Smart Bulb. Implementing an authentication 
method to prevent anyone with a Bluetooth device from connecting and controlling the light bulb 
eliminated the critical vulnerability that was identified in my testing of the JB Smart Bulb. The 
HaoDeng developers also provided the owner of the light bulb with a means to grant role-based 
security by giving them the option of assigning visitor or administrator privileges to new users of 
the lightbulbs.  
Both lightbulbs appear to be vulnerable to a MITM attack by using the “just works” 
method of Bluetooth pairing. However, the attacker would need to be within range of the 
Bluetooth connection in order to take over the session. The best way to prevent this attack is to 
be aware of your surroundings and ensure you trust those around your smart devices.  
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IX. Conclusion	
 
IoT devices can make life more convenient for everyone, including cyber criminals. In 
order to resolve the issue, security needs to be a larger focus for the companies that develop IoT 
devices. However, many companies argue that this would cost them more time and money to 
develop a part of their device that is not visible to consumers. Since the majority of consumers 
make their purchasing decisions based on the aesthetic appearance of a product over the security 
of it, companies are discouraged from spending time on developing a secure product.  
As shown in my research, common IoT devices such as light bulbs can be easy to exploit 
with the right toolset. In the case of the JB Smart Bulb, very little technical knowledge is 
required to be able to compromise the entire light bulb. Until consumers begin to truly 
understand the amount of risk they are bringing into their homes by using IoT devices, the 
industry will continue creating more insecure devices for cyber criminals to attack.  
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